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TITLE VII AT FIFTY YEARS:
A SYMPOSIUM
Ann C. McGinley*
The UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law hosted the 8th Annual Collo-
quium on Current Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law on September 27
and 28, 2013 in Las Vegas, Nevada. The Colloquium provided an opportunity
for labor and employment law scholars to present works-in-progress and
receive feedback from their colleagues in the field.1
Participants discussed developments in labor and employment law in the
workplace law landscape of Las Vegas. Las Vegas is considered to be a global
playground, but this image obscures the hard work and difficult issues that exist
“behind the curtain.”2 With one of the highest percentages of union-represented
workers in the country,3 Las Vegas is one of the last union towns in the United
States. This is a paradox because Nevada is a “right to work” state, a state that
guarantees to employees the “right” not to join a union.4 Colloquium attendees
learned about the impact that the Culinary Workers Union has had on the Las
Vegas hospitality industry and the Las Vegas community. Professor Ruben
Garcia moderated a panel discussion with members of the union at a dinner at
the union hall on Friday, September 27, 2013.
The Colloquium also presented a number of panels on issues surrounding
the law of collective bargaining as well as law related to the employment rela-
tionship in non-union workplaces. Some of the panels included: A Labor His-
tory and Pedagogy: Protecting Employee Voice and Rights to Organize;
Reforming Work and Labor Law; Politics at Work: Dissent, Tenure and Judi-
cial Roles; Empirical Perspectives on Employee Privacy, Safety and Employ-
ment Law; Work Law, Employment Status, Class and Gender; Employee
Benefits and Detriments; and At-Will, Class and the Regulation of Employee
Capital.
* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Boyd School of
Law. Thanks go to Dan Hamilton, the Dean of UNLV Boyd School of Law for supporting
the Colloquium, to my colleague Ruben Garcia for his hard work on the Colloquium, to
Jeanne Price, the Director of the law library at UNLV who created a book display for the
colloquium, and to Nicole Scott and Brittany Llewellyn and the other members of the
Nevada Law Journal for their work on this symposium issue. Thanks also go to Christine
Smith, Elaina Bhattacharyya, Nettie Mann, Shweta Kadam, Don Castle, and all the staff and
student workers who toiled to make the colloquium a success.
1 8th Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law, UNLV
WILLIAM S. BOYD SCH. OF L., http://law.unlv.edu/LaborLaw2013 (last visited May 13,
2014).
2 See id.
3 Nicholas Riccardi, Right-to-Work Nevada a Rare Bright Spot for Labor, AP (Dec. 17,
2012, 3:25 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/right-work-nevada-rare-bright-spot-labor.
4 Id.
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The Colloquium was unique also because of the approaching 50th Anni-
versary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
which forbids discrimination in employment based on race, color, national ori-
gin, religion, and sex, was enacted on July 2, 1964.6 In many ways, Las Vegas
represents the past and future of anti-discrimination law. Casinos located on the
famous Las Vegas Strip were strictly segregated until 1960; before 1960, even
famous black entertainers such as Sammy Davis Jr. could not stay in a Strip
hotel.7 Blacks in Las Vegas lived in the segregated West Las Vegas, where the
Moulin Rouge Hotel, Las Vegas’s first racially integrated hotel and casino,
opened on May 24, 1955.8 Many black and white celebrities visited and per-
formed at the Moulin Rouge, including, among others, Lena Horne, Duke
Ellington, Harry Belafonte, Jack Benny and Frank Sinatra.9
Although it was open for only about six months, the Moulin Rouge’s pop-
ularity led to the desegregation of casinos on the Las Vegas Strip.10 In 1960, at
the threat of a march to desegregate the casinos on the Strip, the Nevada gover-
nor brokered a meeting of hotel owners, state and local officials, and local
black leaders that resulted in an agreement that the Strip hotels would
desegregate.11
Las Vegas, and more broadly, the casino industry in Nevada, is also an
important center for studying and understanding issues of gender. I often tell
those who ask about my research that the Las Vegas Strip is my laboratory
because of the unique overlap of employment and gender issues presented by
the casino hotels.12
For example, many outsiders find the regulation and control of the cos-
tuming and hiring of Las Vegas cocktail servers troubling, and arguably con-
trary to the dictates of Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition. I agree, but
the issue is more complicated than many suggest. Casino jobs offer to many
women living in Las Vegas middle class salaries, benefits, and lifestyles
unheard of for hospitality or other blue-collar workers in many cities. There is a
5 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
6 42 U.S.C. §§2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
7 Michael Lyle, Black Community Pushed to End Racial Discrimination in Las Vegas, LAS
VEGAS REV. J. (Feb. 15, 2014, 9:36 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/black
-community-pushed-end-racial-discrimination-las-vegas.
8 John Przybys, Moulin Rouge’s Brief, Shining Moment to Shine Once More, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., (May 19, 2013, 12:53 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/entertainment/arts
-culture/moulin-rouges-brief-shining-moment-shine-once-more.
9 On This Date: May 29, 2003 The Closed Moulin Rouge Caught Fire, LAS VEGAS 360
(May 29, 2013), http://www.lasvegas360.com/2634/moulin-rouge/.
10 Id.
11 Claytee White, The March that Never Happened: Desegregating the Las Vegas Strip, 5
NEV. L.J. 71, 82 (2004).
12 See generally Ann C. McGinley, Masculinity, Labor and Sexual Power, 93 BOSTON U. L.
REV. 795 (2013); Ann C. McGinley, Trouble in Sin City: Protecting Sexy Workers’ Civil
Rights, 23 STANFORD L. & POL’Y REV. 253 (2012); Ann C. McGinley, Harassing “Girls” at
the Hard Rock: Masculinities in Sexualized Environments, 2007 U. ILL L. REV. 1229 (2007);
Ann C. McGinley, Babes and Beefcake: Exclusive Hiring Arrangements and Sexy Dress
Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER, L.& POL’Y 257 (2007) [hereinafter McGinley, Babes and Beef-
cake]; Ann C. McGinley, Harassment of Sex(y) Workers: Applying Title VII to Sexualized
Industries, 18 YALE J.L. &. FEMINISM 65 (2006).
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serious question as to whether as a matter of policy the law should interfere
with the employee’s choice to work in those positions and to adhere to the
employers’ sexy dress codes, especially in the unionized casinos.
On the other hand, in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc.,13 a case
about a female bartender in Reno, Nevada who was fired for refusing to wear
makeup, the Ninth Circuit concluded in an en banc decision that the casino’s
gender-based dress code did not violate the prohibition against gender discrimi-
nation in Title VII.14 But the case may be even more important for its dicta than
for its holding. While holding for the casino, a majority of the en banc court
stated that it would be illegal for the employer to use dress codes that unreason-
ably sex-stereotype the individual.15 It seems from this language that the
employer who seeks to sexualize female cocktail servers would have to prove
that female sexuality is a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) for the
job.16 Given that the BFOQ is a very narrow exception to Title VII, there is a
serious question as to whether a casino employer could prove a BFOQ defense
if sued for hiring only women, or only women with a particular sexy look, or
for demanding that their female employees wear sexy costumes.17 The dicta in
Jespersen, then, is intriguing because it raises the question of whether it would
be permissible for a casino owner to regulate female employee dress in a way
that sex stereotypes the women. Given the importance and prominence of the
female cocktail server in the Las Vegas casino industry, this language should
not be taken lightly.
Jespersen led to an important symposium at Duke Law School on per-
forming gender in the workplace,18 to many other articles on gender and
work,19 and to a study that I conducted with Professors Tracey George of Van-
derbilt and Mitu Gulati of Duke of how the Las Vegas courts, employment
lawyers, casino managers and women who work in the casinos reacted to the
decision.20 It is just one example of the importance of Nevada to the anti-
discrimination laws. The unique combination of labor issues presented by the
heavily unionized workforce and the gender issues present in the casino indus-
try make Nevada and Las Vegas in particular an important locale for studying
labor and employment law, especially Title VII law.
Many of the panels at the Colloquium dealt with the law of Title VII and
other anti-discrimination law statutes. Panels on anti-discrimination law
included: Identity and Discrimination Models; Disability Law After the
ADAAA; Anti-discrimination and the Equal Opportunity Principle; Labor Con-
cepts in Anti-discrimination Law in the Changing Economic Environment;
Comparative Labor, Employment and Anti-discrimination Law; Proving
Employment Discrimination in the 21st Century; Analyzing the Intersection of
13 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1111–13.
16 See McGinley, Babes and Beefcake, supra note 12.
17 Id.
18 Groundbreaking Symposium Explores Trends in Employment Discrimination, DUKE LAW
(Oct. 12, 2006), http://law.duke.edu/features/2006/makeuppromo/.
19 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1–560 (2007).
20 Tracey E. George et al., The New Old Legal Realism, 105 NW. L. REV. 689 (2011).
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Work and Family Law; and Examining the 2012-2013 Supreme Court
Decisions.
To commemorate the 50th Anniversary of Title VII, at the Colloquium, I
moderated a lunch panel entitled Title VII at its 50th Anniversary and its
Importance to Labor and Work Law where Professors Vicki Schultz of Yale
Law School and Tanya Hernandez of Fordham Law School discussed the past
and future of Title VII and its relationship to other employment law issues.
Professor Schultz discussed, “Rationalizing the Workplace: Title VII’s Lasting
Contribution after 50 Years.” Professor Hernandez examined, “The Judicial
Understanding of Unconscious Racism in Employment Discrimination Cases:
A Tale of the ‘Good, the Bad and the Ugly.’”21
This issue of the Nevada Law Journal publishes a selection of the papers
presented at the Colloquium and other papers submitted for a symposium issue
on Title VII to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of Title VII. Given the
importance of the anti-discrimination law in Nevada in particular and to the rest
of the U.S., I am honored to write this introduction to the Title VII symposium.
While the casinos in Nevada were desegregated before the passage of the Civil
Rights Act, there is no question that the federal law enabled the hiring and
promotion of many women and persons of color in the industry. It is particu-
larly fitting that this Nevada Law Journal issue include as well a mini-sympo-
sium on Nevada law on the 150th anniversary of Nevada’s statehood.22
The articles selected for the symposium on Title VII have an interesting
scope, both procedurally and substantively. They range from the undue preva-
lence of summary judgment grants to defendants in Title VII cases to the
Supreme Court’s recent case limiting the procedure for bringing a retaliation
claim under Title VII, from the importance of the National Labor Relations
Board to the enforcement of Title VII principles to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s interpretation of the disparate impact cause of
action to forbid employers from automatically refusing to hire employees with
arrest or conviction records. They focus on procedure and substance, disparate
treatment and disparate impact models of discrimination, models of proving
causation in Title VII cases, retaliation, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s procedures, the National Labor Relations Board’s recent deci-
sions interpreting provisions of the National Labor Relations Act that comple-
ment remedies for Title VII protected classes in non-unionized workplaces,
how bullying and harassment interact in workplaces, and the question of
whether diversity is a justification for color- and race-based decision making in
workplaces. A number propose statutory amendments and/or new federal law,
including amendments to Title VII, to bolster the rights of employees to benefit
from the anti-retaliation provisions, a proposal that we continue strengthening
the NLRA, and a proposal that would add a federal anti-bullying statute to
complement Title VII.
21 The tradition of awarding the Paul Steven Miller Scholarship Award to a member of the
labor and employment law professoriate continued. Past honorees include Professors
Michael J. Zimmer and Charles Sullivan. This year’s awardee was Professor Marley Weiss
of the University of Maryland, Francis King Carey School of Law.
22 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Symposium: Nevada Law at 150, 14 NEV. L.J. 831 (2014).
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In The Trouble with Torgerson: The Latest Effort to Summarily Adjudicate
Employment Discrimination Cases,23 Theresa Beiner continues her scholarship
on the intersection of employment discrimination and summary judgment. She
explains that employment discrimination scholars have lamented the frequency
with which courts grant summary judgment in employment discrimination
cases, and criticizes Torgerson v. City of Rochester,24 an Eighth Circuit case
that explains that there is no discrimination law exception to the rules on sum-
mary judgment.
Professor Beiner demonstrates through statistics and anecdotal evidence,
that courts, instead of treating employment discrimination cases as exceptions
to summary judgment, actually ignore the difficulty of demonstrating intent
without a fact hearing, and grant summary judgment when there are significant
factual disputes. Unlike other types of federal cases where courts refuse to
grant summary judgment because of issues of intent, in Title VII cases, courts
often ignore the thorny issue of intent and usurp the role of the fact finder.
In essence, Professor Beiner agrees and disagrees with Torguson. She
agrees that there is no “special rule” about employment discrimination cases
and summary judgment. But, she disagrees with the courts’ application of this
general principle. She argues that, in reality, courts bend over backwards in
employment discrimination cases to grant summary judgment even though if
they were to apply the rules and principles regarding genuine issues of material
fact and the difficulty of proving intent neutrally there would be far fewer sum-
mary judgments of employment discrimination cases.
Professor Beiner argues that federal courts are biased toward defendants in
employment discrimination cases. Beiner cites statistical proof that demon-
strates that when acting as fact finders, trial judges find for plaintiffs in employ-
ment discrimination cases much less frequently than juries do.25 Furthermore,
she points to former federal Judge Nancy Gertner’s claim that judges, while
believing that they are unbiased, are actually biased in favor of defendants. This
occurs, according to Gertner, because judges do not see the strongest cases and
they write detailed opinions when granting summary judgment, thereby creat-
ing the impression that all employment discrimination cases are frivolous.26
Moreover, Beiner notes that Gertner states that during judicial training for fed-
eral judges, the trainer instructed the judges on “how to get rid of” employment
discrimination cases.27 She concludes that courts should be more cautious
about granting summary judgment in employment discrimination cases, espe-
cially because of our knowledge of unconscious biases, some evidence that
judges, like other human beings, are subject to these biases, and the difficulty
of determining intent from a dry, paper record.28
Like Beiner, Professor Mike Zimmer criticizes the judicial lack of forbear-
ance when it comes to Title VII cases. While Beiner disagrees with the lower
23 Theresa M. Beiner, The Trouble with Torgerson: The Latest Effort to Summarily Adjudi-
cate Employment Discrimination Cases, 14 NEV. L.J. 673 (2014).
24 Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F. 3d 1031, 1031 (8th Cir. 2011).
25 Beiner, supra note 23 at 694–95 nn.147–54 and accompanying text.
26 Id. at 697 nn.160–62 and accompanying text.
27 Id. at n.163 and accompanying text.
28 Id. at 704.
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courts for their hair-trigger decisions to grant summary judgment, Zimmer con-
demns the United States Supreme Court for its willingness to ignore the plain
text of Title VII in order to avoid an excess of retaliation cases in the federal
courts and frivolous lawsuits. Zimmer, in Hiding the Statute in Plain View:
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,29 argues that it is
time for Congress to pass a Civil Rights Restoration Act. He criticizes the
Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, which he believes is contrary to the text
and the spirit of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. In Nassar, the Court concluded that
the “motivating factor” test is inapplicable to prove “mixed motives” in cases
brought under Title VII that allege retaliation for opposing illegal practices or
participating in legal processes to redress a Title VII violation.
42 USC Sec. 2000e-2(m) states: “Except as otherwise provided in this
title, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a moti-
vating factor for any employment practice even though other factors also moti-
vated the practice.”30
Once the plaintiff proves that an illegal consideration motivated an
employment practice, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have “taken the same action in
the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.”31
These provisions were added to the statue in the 1991 Civil Rights Act
(“CRA of 1991”) where the Congress partially overruled the holding of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.32 The CRA of 1991 makes clear that once an
employee establishes that an unlawful reason is a motivating factor for the
adverse employment action, the plaintiff has established a violation.33 At this
point, the employer may respond by proving that it would have taken the same
action even if it had not been motivated by the illegal factor.34 If the employer
can prove that it would have taken the same action, it can reduce the plaintiff’s
remedies to some types of injunctive relief and attorney’s fees.
In retaliation claims, the illegal action is for the employer to retaliate
against the employee for opposing illegal discrimination or for participation in
a process that investigates, or prosecutes illegal discrimination. Thus, Professor
Zimmer notes, retaliation is an “unlawful employment action” that is referred to
under Section 2000e-2(m). Therefore, he concludes that the language of the
statute permits plaintiffs to prove unlawful retaliation by using the motivating
factor test, which is considered to require lesser proof than the but for test. The
obvious result of Nassar, Zimmer explains, is to make it more difficult for
plaintiffs to prove retaliation claims against their employers.35
29 Michael J. Zimmer, Hiding the Statute in Plain View: University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar, 14 NEV. L.J. 705 (2014).
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(l)(2)(B).
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (overruling Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989),
by setting forth the applicable standards for “mixed motive” cases).
33 Id.
34 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2(m), 2000e–5(g)(2)(B).
35 Zimmer, supra note 29 at 705 n.5 and accompanying text.
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Professor Zimmer argues that rather than adhering to the text of the stat-
ute, the Supreme Court “slices and dices” the language of the statute, constructs
its own language that replaces that of the statute by differentiating between
“status discrimination” and “retaliation” and, therefore, misinterprets the stat-
ute.36 Given that many members of the majority favor using plain language for
statutory interpretation, Professor Zimmer queries why the Supreme Court
ignored the plain language of Title VII, and substituted its own language for
that of Congress. He notes that the current majority of the Supreme Court is
hostile to Title VII cases and he explains that in the Nassar decision itself the
Court focused on the increase in retaliation claims and on their concern about
frivolous lawsuits.37 Thus, he suggests, as Professor Beiner does in her article,
that the courts’ jurisprudence is swayed by its misplaced concerns about the
prevalence and strength of Title VII suits brought before the courts. Zimmer
concludes that Congress, not the Supreme Court, should make the decision, and
he urges Congress to amend the Act to permit proof of retaliation by using the
motivating factor test.
In Lessons from the Dolphins/Richie Incognito Saga,38 Kerri Lynn Stone
examines the gendered and racial elements of the well-publicized dispute
between Jonathan Martin, the Miami Dolphins NFL football team’s starting
right tackle and his teammate, Richie Incognito. Martin, an African American
man who graduated from Stanford, accused Incognito, a white man, of bullying
him, and using racial epithets when talking to him. Martin walked out on the
team and checked himself into a psychiatric facility. The first reaction in the
news media seemed to be surprise that a 312-pound pro-football player who is
6’5” tall could be bullied by another. Professor Stone argues that Title VII is
not necessarily capable of dealing with all race- and gender-based discrimina-
tory treatment. In fact, the courts require a showing that an “adverse employ-
ment action” occurred or that harassment rose to the level of severe or
pervasive. As a result, much invisible and “de minimus” discriminatory behav-
ior will escape scrutiny under Title VII.39 Stone demonstrates, however, that
much of this behavior can be extremely harmful as was the behavior that was
directed at Jonathan Martin. She proposes that a federal bullying statute be
enacted to complement Title VII.40
Stone uses Title VII analysis to consider the popular reaction to Martin’s
behavior. For example, in hostile work environment cases based on sex, the
plaintiff must prove that the alleged illegal behavior was unwelcome. Often
courts will conclude that the plaintiff demonstrated that she welcomed the
behavior by engaging in sexually-based joking or other similar behavior.41
Jonathan Martin went along with his teammates and responded to the ridicule
and racially derogatory terms by using those terms himself. For some, this par-
36 Id. at 713 nn.45–46 and accompanying text.
37 Id. at 719 nn.73–76 and accompanying text.
38 Kerri Lynn Stone, Lessons from the Dolphins/Richie Incognito Saga, 14 NEV. L.J. 723
(2014).
39 See Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121 (1998).
40 Stone, supra note 37 at 727 nn.26–31 and accompanying text.
41 See, e.g., Beard v. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 798 (8th Cir. 2001); Scusa v. Nestle
U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir. 1999).
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ticipation was confusing, but Stone argues that it does not signify that he wel-
comed the behavior.42 Instead, it shows that, like women alleging sexually
hostile environments, Martin was trying to fit in by adopting the behavior that
was directed at him.43
To me, it was odd that the media invariably described the Martin case as
exclusively about race. Because the relationship occurred between two male
football players, the media was blind to the very clear gendered implications of
the Martin-Incognito relationship. Masculinities theory demonstrates that mas-
culine behavior is not a natural result of the physical manifestation of the male
body. Instead, it is a society’s judgment of how men should act.44 Martin, by
being too “soft” or, in his own words, “a pussy,” was ridiculed by his team-
mates.45 This ridicule served as a means of competition among the teammates
to prove their own masculinity and to attempt to toughen up Martin so that he
would conform to group norms of masculinity. This is clear gender discrimina-
tion, but many courts and commentators would not see the gender discrimina-
tion because the behavior occurred in an all-male, tough environment. We
expect men who play football to be the most masculine men of all, and there-
fore, we conclude that the behavior is just “hazing” or “roughhousing” and that
it has nothing to do with illegal harassment based on gender. This conclusion,
however, merely refuses to see the harm that men can do to other men when
they attempt to prove their own masculinity and demand that others adhere to
their standards.
Professor Michael Z. Green, in How the NLRB’s Light Still Shines on Anti-
Discrimination Law Fifty Years After Title VII,46 examines the “[u]nlikely
impact of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) on anti-
discrimination law principles used to protect employees.”47 Like Professor
Stone, Green suggests that another statute (in his case, the NLRA, and in hers a
proposed federal anti-bullying statute) can be useful in supplementing the rights
and remedies established in Title VII. Green contends that the NLRB plays an
important role in enforcing anti-discrimination law principles. That role has
been more pronounced during the Obama administration, whose Board has
dealt with issues surrounding the right to concerted behavior granted by Section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and its enforcement provi-
sion, Section 8(a)(1), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere with the employees’ rights to concerted action.48
The interesting point is that until recently many employers were unaware
that the NLRA protects employees even in non-union workplaces.49 Given the
decline of unionism in the U.S. workforce and the inability of Title VII to
address certain issues through agency action of the Equal Employment Oppor-
42 Stone, supra note 37 at 734 n.70 and accompanying text.
43 Id. at 746–47 nn.146–54 and accompanying text.
44 See Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Identities Cubed: Perspectives on Mul-
tidimensional Masculinities Theory, 13 NEV. L.J. 326, 337 (2013).
45 Stone, supra note 37 at 750 n.173 and accompanying text.
46 Michael Z. Green, How the NLRB’s Light Still Shines on Anti-discrimination Law Fifty
Years After Title VII, 14 NEV. L.J. 754 (2014).
47 Id. at 754 nn.3–4 and accompanying text.
48 Id. at 756–61.
49 Id. at 767 n.105 and accompanying text.
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tunity Commission (“EEOC”), or through legislative change, Green argues, the
protections provided by NLRB decisions are particularly important to protect
against illegal discrimination in the workplace.50 The Obama administration’s
NLRB has held that it is illegal for employers to enforce policies against non-
unionized employees that prohibit them from discussing salaries or other confi-
dential information, that prohibit disparagement of the employer, and that limit
certain communications on social media.51 It has also held that limitations on
employees’ use of class actions in arbitrations violates the Act.52 Green con-
cludes that it is crucial for those concerned about the rights of employees pro-
tected by the anti-discrimination statutes to oppose the recent efforts to defang
the NLRB because the Board not only protects concerted activity generally, but
also protects speech and other concerted activity engaged in by employees who
are trying to resist an employer’s discriminatory policies.53
Professor Tammy Pettinato, in Defying “Common Sense?”: The Legiti-
macy of Applying Title VII to Employer Criminal Records Policies,54 examines
the use of Title VII disparate impact theory to challenge employer policies that
limit hiring of persons with convictions and arrest records. Given that arrests
and convictions disproportionately affect the communities of black and Latino
men, Pettinato explains that disparate impact, which makes it illegal for an
employer to use hiring or employment policies that create a disparate impact on
a protected group if the employer cannot prove that the policy is job-related to
the specific job in question and consistent with business necessity,55 is a partic-
ularly appropriate tool for examining the employer’s reasons for refusing to
hire an individual.56 She posits that Latino and black men constitute two-thirds
of the prison population in the U.S.,57 and argues that it is harmful to society if
we permit employers to render whole groups of society unemployable without
making individual determinations.58 Pettinato gets this point right. Michelle
Alexander, in The New Jim Crow, ably demonstrates that black and Latino
working class and poor communities have been subject to extreme police
behavior bordering on military action as a result of the “War on Drugs.”59
“Stop and Frisk” tactics predominate in these neighborhoods, leading inevitably
to a disproportionate number of arrests and convictions of young blacks and
Latinos, even though drug use in the white community is approximately equal
50 Id. at n. 756 nn.13–14 and accompanying text.
51 For more information on NLRB position on social media policies, see generally Ann C.
McGinley & Ryan P. McGinley-Stempel, Beyond the Water Cooler: Speech and the Work-
place in an Era of Social Media, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 75 (2012).
52 Green, supra note 45 at 756 n.13 and accompanying text.
53 One example of recent efforts to limit the NLRB’s power is the case currently before the
Supreme Court that seeks to overturn President Obama’s recess appointments to the Board.
See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert granted sub nom, NLRB v.
Noel Canning, 133 S.Ct. 2861 (2013).
54 Tammy R. Pettinato, Defying “Common Sense?”: The Legitimacy of Applying Title VII to
Employer Criminal Records Policies, 14 NEV. L.J. 770 (2014).
55 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (k) (2012).
56 Pettinato, supra note 53 at 776, 776 n.47.
57 Id. at 770 n.5 and accompanying text.
58 Id. at 778.
59 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 4–8 (2010).
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to that in black and Latino communities.60 Moreover, the “no tolerance” move-
ment in the schools has also led to criminalization of behavior by minority boys
that many see as a pipeline to the prison system.61
Pettinato explains that in 2012 the EEOC promulgated an enforcement
guidance that encourages employers to rely less on bright-line exclusionary
policies and more on individualized assessments of applicants and employ-
ees.62 These assessments do not discourage the use of criminal records to make
hiring and other employment decisions, but urge individual determinations that
take into account multiple factors, including the facts or circumstances of the
offense, the number of offenses, the individual’s age at time of conviction,
evidence that the individual performed the same type of work after release
without incident, the length and consistency of the individual’s employment
history, etc.63
Pettinato then explains that even though the new guidance is a version of a
previous EEOC policy, there has been substantial negative reaction to the gui-
dance.64 One prominent reaction came from a group of nine state attorneys
general who made various arguments against the policy.65 Pettinato addresses
all of the criticisms of the attorneys general, ultimately demonstrating that their
opposition is largely groundless.66 She concludes that the letter of the attorneys
general constitutes an indirect attack on the legitimacy of the EEOC and on the
disparate impact theory of discrimination, and argues that Congress, not the
EEOC, would be the appropriate recipient of the letter because the EEOC is
properly enforcing Title VII law through its adherence to the guidance.67
In Misconstruing Notice in EEOC Administrative Processing & Concilia-
tion,68 Angela Morrison argues that federal courts are misapplying the EEOC’s
notice requirements in the administrative processing and conciliation of
employee charges of discrimination against employers. Morrison explains that
federal courts have recently dismissed cases brought in federal court by the
EEOC on the basis that during the administrative procedures when the charge
was before the EEOC there was insufficient notice to the employer.69 Morrison
argues that the purposes and effect of notice differ during the EEOC process
and civil litigation, and, therefore, defendants should not be permitted to claim
in subsequent civil litigation an affirmative defense of lack of notice during the
administrative proceedings.70
60 Id. at 191.
61 Id. at 11.
62 See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION
RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,
at 8 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm.
63 Pettinato, supra note 53 at 773 n.18 and accompanying text.
64 Id. at 771–72 n.11 and accompanying text.
65 Id. at 772 n.12 and accompanying text.
66 Id. at 775–84 nn.43–90 and accompanying text.
67 Id. at 784.
68 Angela D. Morrison, Misconstruing Notice in EEOC Administrative Processing & Con-
ciliation, 14 NEV. L.J. 785 (2014).
69 Id. at 786 n.3 and accompanying text.
70 Id. at 779, 776–77 nn.45–51 and accompanying text.
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To understand Morrison’s arguments, one must examine the differences
between the power and authority of the EEOC in its administrative role during
the charge processing phase and the role of the EEOC as a plaintiff in civil
litigation brought subsequent to filing and investigation of a charge. When an
individual files a charge with the EEOC, the EEOC investigates the charge. In
doing so, it sends notice to the employer of the charge. At this point, the EEOC
is acting as a neutral investigator whose ultimate purpose it to attempt to con-
ciliate the claim. In this process, the purpose is to notify the defendant
employer to begin its own investigation and to preserve records that may
become relevant further on during the administrative process and, if it occurs,
subsequent litigation.71 After the EEOC conducts the investigation, which
includes the right to subpoena documents from the employer, the EEOC
engages in an evaluation of the substance of the charge as well as an attempt to
conciliate the charge. If and when the conciliation fails, the EEOC must notify
the employer of its failure. At this point, while most charging parties must find
an attorney to further prosecute their claims in state or federal court, the EEOC
selects a number of cases to litigate on behalf of a class or an individual in
court. It is in response to the EEOC’s filing of a complaint in federal court that
Morrison tells us that employers have recently asserted an affirmative defense
or have filed motions to dismiss the Commission’s complaint based on inade-
quate notice in the claims processing stage at the EEOC. Courts are split on the
merits of this practice, but many, according to Morrison, are confused about the
difference between the purposes of the notice in both fora.72
Morrison argues that it is important to understand the different purposes of
the EEOC processes and civil litigation. While civil litigation may result in an
adjudication of liability against the employer, the EEOC investigation and con-
ciliation process merely gives the employer the opportunity voluntarily to con-
ciliate the claim.73 Thus, she argues that the due process concerns for each
forum differ significantly. As there is no risk of adjudication or liability as a
result of the EEOC processes, there are fewer due process concerns. Moreover,
the EEOC’s determination of whether or not probable cause exists has no
preclusive effect on subsequent litigation. In contrast, at the litigation stage
where the EEOC serves as the plaintiff, notice to the employer is crucial
because there will be a final judgment, and potential liability as a result of the
civil litigation.
Professor Kingsley Browne, in Title VII and Diversity,74 argues that even
though the United States Supreme Court sanctioned the use of affirmative
action for remedial purposes in United Steelworkers v. Weber75 and Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,76 the Supreme Court would likely
71 Id. at 789–90 nn.25–34 and accompanying text.
72 Id. at 792–94.
73 Id. at 794–95.
74 Kingsley Browne, Title VII and Diversity, 14 NEV. L.J. 806 (2014).
75 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979) (holding that a program
between the union and the employer to permit 50 percent of the slots in a training program to
go to black employees was permissible given the union’s failure to permit blacks entry into
job training programs in the past).
76 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (permitting affirmative action in a gen-
der case where gender was one of many factors considered and there were no women of
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not find that diversity is a legitimate reason for taking race (and perhaps, gen-
der) into account in hiring or promotion decisions.77 Browne employs a color-
blind approach and questions diversity as a justification for using race-based
decision-making under Title VII. In doing so, he argues from the plain lan-
guage of Title VII, and states that after Johnson, corporations have shifted from
a remedial approach to affirmative action to a forward-looking “instrumental
rationale” that corporations name “diversity.”78 He notes that corporations have
concluded that diversity is good for business, but he disputes that argument,
stating that the studies are mixed, at best, in demonstrating that diversity actu-
ally enhances business.79 In fact, he argues that the support for diversity is
really a type of a “customer preference” argument, which traditionally the
courts have rejected as a basis for taking one’s protected characteristics into
account.80 He properly notes that Congress did not provide the bona fide occu-
pational qualification (“BFOQ”) exception for race, and that even for sex, the
BFOQ exception is a narrow one, one with which the diversity rationale would
not fit comfortably. He concludes by arguing that Congress would have to
amend the statute to permit diversity as a justification for racial or gender pref-
erences in employment decisions, and even if it did, a diversity rationale may
violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.81
These articles present a rich array of topics and treatment of important
Title VII issues. There is no question that Title VII has worked exceedingly
well in many respects. There are many more women in professional and mana-
gerial positions than ever before. Persons of color are beginning to move up in
professions and businesses. But in many ways Title VII has moved slowly. It
has moved forward, but on a number of occasions the United States Supreme
Court has contracted the interpretation of the statute, moving it backwards. Fre-
quently, in response to the Court’s contraction of Title VII rights, Congress has
intervened to overturn the limiting interpretations of the Supreme Court. This is
a slow, and time-consuming process. I hope that in the next fifty years Title VII
will continue to move forward to protect workers’ rights without the backward
movements, to prevent discrimination and to make whole those who have suf-
fered from discrimination. Only if the statute is permitted to soar, and the
courts reject the temptation to restrict the meaning of Title VII, will it be an
instrument of equality that will live up to its promise fifty years ago.
nearly 400 in the skilled trade job category to which a woman was promoted over the male
plaintiff).
77 Browne, supra note 73 at 817.
78 Id. at 813–14 nn.48–49 and accompanying text.
79 Id. at 815–17 nn.54–67 and accompanying text.
80 Id. at 817 n.70 and accompanying text.
81 Id. at 830 n.160 and accompanying text.
